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THE TREATY-MAKING POWER
Professor Myres S. McDougal led a discussion on the
American Bar Association resolution relative to the proposed
constitutional amendments to limit the treaty-making power.
Mr. Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Chairman of the Section of In-
ternational and Comparative Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, was also present to express his views. A member of
the American Bar Association Committee on "Peace and Law
through United Nations" had been invited to defend the
resolution, but was not present at the meeting. Professor
McDougal expressed his extreme regret at this absence. Pro-
fessor McDougal opened the discussion by reading the Ameri-
can Bar Association resolution and Senator Bricker's
resolution. He considered these proposals under five heads:
I. The kind of foreign affairs power the United States
needs in the contemporary world.
II. The kind of foreign affairs power we now have in
the United States.
III. The conditions that produced the present struc-
ture of control over foreign affairs and the significance
of such conditions for our contemporary national in-
terests.
IV. The current criticisms of our foreign affairs
powers and the assumptions upon which these criticisms
are based.
V. The validity of the current criticisms when as-
sessed against our contemporary need.
I. The kind of foreign affairs power we need.
In this world we are interdependent with all other peoples
aspiring to be free for the most elemental security, and a
fortiori for all the other values we cherish. The most inten-
sive cooperation of all free peoples will be required to pre-
HeinOnline -- 1952 Proceedings of the American Branch of the International Law Association 13 1952
14 Proceedings
serve security and other democratic values. No nation in the
world today has freedom of decision in fact. What Professor
Lowenstein has said about the illusion of sovereignty is most
relevant to our present inquiry. The one realistic question is
how effectively we can participate in-not how successfully we
can hide ourselves from-the transnational decisions which
shape our future.
The kind of foreign affairs power we need to cope with the
problems of contemporary world conditions may be deter-
mined by elaborating in detail such criteria as the following:
democracy, efficiency (quickness, flexibility, rationality in
respect to values), representativeness of national interest,
responsibility to other nation-states, and maintenance of
civilian supremacy.
II. The kind of foreign affairs power we have.
Save for the veto of a minority third of the Senate over
treaties, we have today a foreign affairs power which meets
the criteria specified above. It is sufficiently comprehensive
and flexible to secure national interests and to permit our
assumption of leadership in the free world, but sufficiently
limited to protect individual rights and discourage aggrandize-
ment of official power. (An over-all summary and documenta-
tion appears in McDougal and Leighton, The Rights of Man in
the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Ra-
tional Action 59 Yale L. J. 60, 90-106.)
By 165 years of constitutional development it has been
determined that the treaty-making power extends to every
matter of "genuine international concern". Yet the Supreme
Court has many times asserted its willingness, if occasion ever
requires, to review a treaty for its relation to international
concern and for its compatibility with the express prohibitions
of the Constitution.
The treaty-making power was intentionally left undefined
in the Constitution, because, as Madison explained, no defini-
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tion could anticipate all future national exigencies and it would
be unwise to impose unnecessary restraint. Upon this, it is
certainly appropriate for us to recall the wisdom of the fore-
fathers. Contrast the attitude of contemporary spokesmen
who profess to be afraid to leave decision to their successors.
From the beginning of our history, it has been established
that agreements within the scope of the treaty power override
all contrary state laws and policies. Within this domain, there
are no rights reserved to the states. This was the decision of
the Supreme Court on our very first treaty, the treaty of peace
with Great Britain, and it has never been departed from.
Similarly, by Article VI(2), the exercise of the treaty-
making power is made a "legislative act", establishing in-
ternal law for all decision-makers and private individuals.
The collaboration of the President and two-thirds of the
Senate are given effects equivalent to those obtainable by the
whole Congress and a unified national policy is assured.
History suggests that approval of two-thirds of the Senate is
a legislative act no more easily secured than a majority vote
of both Houses.
Whether an international agreement in fact becomes im-
mediately internal law in the United States, binding upon all
officials and individuals, depends upon the terms of the
agreement, and upon what the United States has promised.
If the United States promises that the agreement shall bind
immediately, then by Article VI(2) it so binds. If, however,
what the United States promises is that some further action
will be taken by the Congress or other official body before
internal obligation, there is nothing for Article VI(2) to make
immediately binding. Nothing in the much mooted decision
in the Seii Fujii interferes in the slightest with the power of
the United States to protect itself against premature obliga-
tion by the express terms of its agreement. The phrases
"self-executing" and "non-self-executing" are no more than
lawyers' gobbledygook for ascertaining the intent of the
parties when that intent is left obscure.
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The whole Congress has wide powers, granted by the ex-
press terms of the Constitution and exercised in hundreds
of instances since the beginning of our history, to frame
policies to guide the President in his conduct of negotiations
and to validate agreements negotiated by him as the law of
the land. Contemporary constructions of the war and com-
merce and other powers offer indispensable protection against
the minority third veto in the Senate. (See 250 pages of
documentation in McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congres-
sional-Executive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy, 54 Yale L. J. 181, 534 (1945).)
As "the Executive" and as "the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy", the President has very broad powers
to make international agreements. These powers, like the
treaty power, are wisely undefined in the Constitution and,
also like the treaty power, may be expanded, without danger
of tyranny, to meet any exigencies that the nation may
confront.
The broad scope of the powers outlined above need cause
no fear of official oppression or unnecessary invasion of
private rights. They are subjected to certain severe limita-
tions and are compensated by a balancing of powers in the
government that will protect our liberties so long as we
desire to protect them.
It is agreed by all competent authorities that international
agreements are subject to judicial review not only for the
genuineness of their international concern but also for their
compliance with the Bill of Rights and other direct prohibi-
tions of the Constitution. The much maligned decision in
Missouri v. Holland offers nothing to the contrary. In fact
Mr. Justice Holmes in his opinion expressly reserves such
power. That case decided only that the flight of migratory
birds was within the scope of the treaty power, even if one
assumed a narrow interpretation, now rejected by the
Supreme Court, of the commerce power of the Congress.
The words of the Constitution and the consistent doctrine
HeinOnline -- 1952 Proceedings of the American Branch of the International Law Association 16 1952
American Branch of the International Law Association
and practice of the Supreme Court afford that court full
opportunity to exercise judicial review over international
agreements so long as it chooses to do so.
The foreign affairs power, in all its manifestations, is
also balanced by the powers of the whole Congress.
The whole Congress can at any time by simple majority
vote enact a statute repealing the internal effects of any
international agreement. This is a power which has been
exercised many times and sustained by the Supreme Court.
An international agreement of consequence for present pur-
poses must, furthermore, eventually require for its imple-
mentation the appropriation of funds from the whole
Congress. By withholding funds, the Congress can make
the agreement impotent as a tool of oppression.
So much misconception is abroad that it should perhaps
be emphasized that the United States is more securely pro-
tected against international agreements than any other major
nation, except Canada. It is the only major nation which
requires a two-thirds vote of a legislative body for approval
of treaties. It has further much greater protection in judi-
cial review and the Bill of Rights than most nations have.
Contrast, for example, the situation in Great Britain where
there is no explicit judicial review, where the executive can
make any agreement a binding international agreement, and
where a simple majority vote of the legislature, which must
stand for re-election if it does not support the executive, can
make any agreement the law of the land. In his masterful ad-
dress in the 1951 Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, Professor Lawrence Preuss has reviewed the
agreement making procedures of the major nations and has
demonstrated that, apart from its unique protections, the
United States has very much the same procedures for the
making and implementation of international agreements as
the other nations. The continued charge by critics of the
treaty-making power that the United States is peculiarly
vulnerable must be ascribed to lack of information.
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III. The conditions that produced the present structure
of our foreign affairs power.
It was found under the Articles of Confederation that
the central government would not even make and enforce
peace so long as the individual states had a voice in foreign
affairs. The principal purpose for calling the Constitutional
Convention was to make this nation "one" so far as other
nation-states were concerned. If this was necessary for a
rural community of a few million people, scattered along the
Atlantic seaboard in the world of that time, consider how
much more imperative it is for our contemporary nation in
the contemporary world.
Is it in fact true that there are in this country sectional
interests in international affairs that in the long run differ
from the interests of the whole nation? Any one section of
the country is as much interested as any other in the preser-
vation of our national independence from external encroach-
ment or internal erosion. Mr. Lans and I wrote in summary:
4 . . .when our security system breaks down, every
section of the country is put to work, and men are drafted
from every section of the country, to repair the breach.
Any one section of the country is as much interested as
any other in the maintenance of full production, employ-
ment, and consumption and in preventing world-wide
economic depression, with its consequent impoverishment
of our national standard of living. Even where some one
section of the country is more interested than any other
section in the price of a particular commodity, the price
of that commodity is dependent upon all the factors which
make up demand, and these factors in turn are ultimately
dependent, if the commodity is of any importance, upon
the whole economy of the nation. What can thus be
shown of the interdependence of all our sections with
respect to security and economic prosperity in the formu-
lation and effects of foreign policy could equally well be
shown with respect to all our other major interests. For
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the long-run achievements of its total values in our inter-
national affairs, any one section of our country is wholly
dependent upon a similar achievement by every other
section. " I
Even if it be assumed that there are sectional interests
deserving protection, the problem remains of identifying such
interests. Mr. Lans and I summarize:
I . ..The first difficult question is whether all sec-
tional interests or just some sectional interests are to be
given this special protection. If all sectional interests,
however short-run or however dangerous to the rest of
the country, are to be protected, the result is complete
disintegration of national policy. As Gouverneur Morris
long ago warned the Constitutional Convention, there
"can be no end of demands for security if every particu-
lar interest is to be entitled to it." If only some sectional
interests are to be protected, the problem is to achieve a
criterion of selection. The only defensible criterion,
other than sheer power, is the public interest, which again
comes back to the national interest. If the alternative of
sheer power is adopted, what begins as mere protection
of sectional interests is transmuted into determination
of national policy without appropriate regard for the
national interest. It is obvious that a negative decision
on behalf of a single section may have the effect of pre-
cluding a positive policy on behalf of the whole nation;
in most instances, we either join a particular interna-
tional organization or enter into a particular agreement
or we do not. Those proponents of a minority veto for
sectional interests who have a real regard for the national
interest are therefore confronted with an irremovable
dilemma. " I
It is not supposed, as the critics of the treaty-making
power assert, that the framers of the Constitution did not
recognize this dilemma and make their decision. One of my
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students, Mr. Richard I. M. Kelton, has made an investiga-
tion of the history of their deliberations, from which I would
like to read to you.
The Bricker Resolution is the culmination of a series of
proposals for constitutional change based on the assumption
that in the drafting of the Constitution the creators did not
envision the broad scope of authority given to the Federal
Government by the Treaty Power. This viewpoint is clearly
stated by Senator Bricker in his speech introducing the
proposal before the Senate.
The joint resolution just introduced is designed to plug
a growing loophole in the Constitution. . . . The menac-
ing loophole we see in the Constitution today was simply
not visible in 1787. . . . The founding fathers did not
dream that the relationship of the American people to
their Government could be altered by treaty.
(Note: Bricker, Congressional Record-Senate, volume 98, February 7,
1952 at pp. 921-22.)
Knowledge derived from their experience of the Treaty
of Peace with Great Britain made the leaders of the Consti-
tutional period aware that treaties could, and that it was
necessary that treaties should, effectively alter the relation-
ship of people in America to their government. Article 6 of
the treaty provided that there was to be no further confisca-
tion of property or persecution of persons for their part in
the war. This section of the treaty gave both economic and
political rights to people in America which State laws had
denied. For example, South Carolina in laws of January
1782 banished some people, confiscated estates of others, and
fined others 10-12% of their total estates for pardons. (Note:
Jensen, The New Nation, 275-7 (1950).) Pennsylvania had
"Test Acts"I which "required that all the white male inhabi-
tants must take an oath renouncing fidelity to George III,
pledging allegiance to Pennsylvania, and agreeing to expose
conspiracies. If they refused to take the oath, they could not
hold office, vote, serve on juries, buy, sell or transfer real
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estate, or sue for the collection of debts. Thousands of Penn-
sylvania residents refused to take the oath." (Note: Ibid.
at 272-4.) In addition New York had passed laws in 1784
which disenfranchised all who had been British officials, who
had helped the British in any way during the war, who had
left the state, or who had joined the British. (Note: Ibid.
at 271-2.) All of these State laws purported to regulate the
relation of people to their government, and the British Treaty
was by its provisions intended to change the relationship the
laws had established.
This practical lesson was not lost on the leadership of the
period and the Constitution was drafted and ratified despite
statements that clearly indicate recognition of the possibility
that a treaty could have an impact on the people's relation-
ship with their government ...
In a second important area Senator Bricker is trying to
revive an issue which had been thoroughly considered and
rejected by the framers of the Constitution. He advocates
making the House of Representatives pass along with a
majority of the Senate an act or joint resolution before a
treaty or executive agreement shall alter or abridge the laws
of the United States or the laws or the Constitution of the
States.
The history of the Convention shows that full consider-
ation was given to the problem and the proposal was twice
soundly defeated. A proposed amendment provided "The
Senate shall have the power to treat with foreign nations,
but no Treaty shall be binding on the United States which
is not ratified by Law." This amendment was defeated, one
for, eight against, one divided. . .
What was accomplished was fully recognized by both
friends and opponents of the Constitution. In Federalist
Paper number 64 Hamilton fully considered the treaty mak-
ing process and defended it with words that should be heeded
today.
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Some are displeased with it, not on account of any
errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when
made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made
only by men invested with legislative authority. These
gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of
our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given
by our governor, are as valid and as binding on all per-
sons whom they concern as the laws passed by our legis,
lature. All constitutional actions of power, whether in
the executive or in the judicial department, have as much
legal validity as obligation as if they proceeded from
the legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given
to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory
they may be when made, certain it is that the people
may, with much propriety commit the power to a distinct
body from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial.
It surely does not follow, that because they have given
the power of making laws to the legislature, that there-
fore they should likewise give them power to do every
other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be
bound and affected.
In number 75 Hamilton dealt with the same problem again
and his objections to including the House of Representatives
in the Treaty Making process are fully explained.
The proposals of Senator Bricker are thus seen to be
nothing more than a reconsideration of matters fully con-
sidered and decisively rejected by the far-sighted founders
of the Constitution. If in their day they deemed it wise to
keep the treaty power unencumbered, today, with the added
complexities of the problems and the greater need for rapid
action, a flexible treaty power is even more necessary and
prudent.
IV. The current criticisms of the foreign affairs power.
The language of the Bricker Resolution and of the recom-
mendation of the Peace Through Law Committee is obscure,
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complicated, and contradictory but certain objectives seem
to underlie both proposals. These may be itemized as:
(1) the provision for individual citizens and our in-
ternal states of some new special protection from the
agreement making power;
(2) the putting of certain agreements wholly beyond
the power of the federal government; and
(3) the provision, by curtailing the powers of the
President, that certain agreements can be made only in
certain ways.
Let us review these objectives in detail in the same man-
ner as in the recent report on the Bricker Resolution of the
Committee on Federal Legislation and the Committee on
International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York. The appraisal of specific objectives we offer,
parallels that to be found in that excellent report.
V. The validity of the current criticisms.
The current criticisms are based upon completely unreal-
istic assumptions and unreasoned fears. The amendments
proposed are not only unnecessary but also threaten to make
the United States a constitutional cripple among the other
nation-states at the very moment when world leadership is
required for national survival.
The one rational amendment to our national foreign
affairs power would be the removal of the minority-third veto
in the Senate and the adoption of a simple majority vote in
both Houses as the procedure for authorizing and approving
important agreements. It is but another of the tragic ironies
of our time that we must today seriously debate proposals
that approach the opposite extreme in minority rule and im-
potence in foreign policy.
Mr. Tondel opened the discussion on this question by re-
marking that he had submitted an article on the subject to a
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monthly periodical which had rejected it because he was ap-
parently "an internationalist"; and that another periodical
had turned down a similar article because he was "not an
internationalist". He felt that unfortunately many of the
people who control the Press are today insistent that only
their own points of view be expressed, even in matters of
detail, and are unwilling to give space to those who disagree
even in part.
He pointed out that the Section on International and Com-
parative Law of the American Bar Association has about 900
members compared with the seven who are on the American
Bar Association Standing Committee on Peace and Law
through United Nations. These seven are men of high repu-
tation who firmly believe that their proposed constitutional
amendment is sound. However, on the whole, they are not
men with much experience in this field, as demonstrated by
the fact that one member of the Committee had remarked in
February that he had learned to his surprise that it was
occasionally quite necessary for the President to have the
power to make executive agreements. A great many lawyers,
the speaker remarked, are thinking for the first time of these
great problems, and we should take particular care to be
patient while they are thinking them through.
This debate started in this way. The proposed Covenant
on Human Rights, which is still in the draft stage, and the
Genocide Convention would, as indicated by Professor
McDougal, impinge on what the Peace and Law Committee
members regard as domestic rights of States as distinguished
from the proper subject matter for treaties. At first, up
until two years ago, emphasis was placed on the power of
the President and the Senate to protect domestic rights by
working out reservations, to the Genocide Convention for
example, which would keep it from being self-executing.
The Section on International and Comparative Law of the
American Bar Association painstakingly prepared proposed
reservations in keeping with the spirit of the Genocide Con-
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vention, and several of these were recommended by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. However, the Fujii case in
California implied that you could say almost nothing by way
of reservation or in a treaty which would prevent it from
being self-executing, and during the long period when the
Fujii case was on appeal (it has now been unanimously re-
versed on this issue), the Committee on Peace and Law began
insisting that a constitutional amendment to limit the treaty-
making power was necessary.
When the Committee on Peace and Law tries to restrict
Congress to its powers otherwise delegated, it is really insist-
ing on the protection of States' rights. It says that the only
protection against an improvident treaty that would take
away the rights of the States is the wisdom of the president
and the Senate, and that that is not enough. However, the
word "treaty" means something, and if the President and
the Senate were to make a "treaty" that did not involve the
proper subject matter for a treaty, it would be up to the Su-
preme Court to determine whether it was a proper treaty. It
has been repeated in at least nine Supreme Court decisions
that the Constitution is supreme over the treaty power.
Another protection against abuse of the treaty power is
that Congress may terminate the domestic effect of a treaty
by a subsequent statute. Why have a constitutional amend-
ment, the speaker asked, when Congress can already do by
subsequent statute what the Committee on Peace and Law
would give Congress power to do by constitutional amend-
ment?
Mr. Tondel disagreed with Professor McDougal's state-
ment as to the extent of the commerce power. He conceded
that it is broader than it used to be and is growing, but he was
not sure that the power to regulate doing business is, for
example, within the commerce power. He felt that it would
be unwise at this juncture in world affairs to try to restrict
the treaty-making power of the Federal Government. If the
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power to make treaties were limited to the powers otherwise
delegated to Congress, many treaties of the ordinary sort,
such as treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, in-
volving as they do the reciprocal right to own property, to do
business, to inherit etc., would have to be approved by each
of the States in order to be fully effective. What would the
bargaining power of the United States be in making treaties
under such conditions ? The suggestion that any treaty should
be implemented by an Act of Congress, in addition to being
ratified by two-thirds of the Senators present, seems an un-
necessary addition to the procedural requirements to ratify
a treaty and make it fully effective. Mr. Tondel stated that
it was his personal opinion that there is certainly no demon-
strated need for a constitutional amendment, and that there
should not be an amendment whether of the sort proposed
by the Committee on Peace and Law through United Nations
or by Senator Bricker.
President Eagleton thanked Professor Myres S. McDougal
and Mr. Lyman M. Tondel, Jr. for participating in the debate.
Evening Session
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION MEETING
The remarks of the speakers at the evening session are
summarized as follows:
President Eagleton welcomed the members and guests and
commented briefly upon the present status of international
law. He referred to recent books by Morgenthau and Kennan
which reject law, morals, and the United Nations as bases
for American foreign policy and seem to suggest that a
nation should build up its own strength and go its own ways.
This is called "realism" though it leads to the same old
anarchy and war. No state can guarantee to its citizens
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